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POLICY CHALLENGE
The IFRS’s defining promise is cross-border comparability of financial state-
ments, but the aim of global harmonisation will not be fully achieved in the
next few years. Given the varying pace and modalities of local IFRS
adoption, the IFRS Foundation must focus on standards quality and the
integrity of its brand. Standard-setting should serve investors’ information
needs, leaving other public-policy
goals to be met through local
assessment by individual jurisdic-
tions. The Foundation’s governance
and funding framework should
become more accountable to the
global investor community. Active
monitoring of local implementation
practices should encourage the
gradual convergence of ‘IFRS
dialects’ towards a true single
global reporting language.2003 2006 2009 2012 (est.)
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THE ISSUE Accounting provides a fundamental underpinning for capital mar-
kets, and the worldwide spread of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) marks one of the most advanced attempts to develop
globally consistent financial rules. The financial crisis has generated heated
debate on the economic role of fair-value accounting and other IFRS princi-
ples. Underlying these controversies are differing views about the mission
and governance of accounting standard-setters, and how standards inter-
act with other public policy instruments. Choices are made more difficult by
the absence of relevant precedents for the unique institutional features of
the global standard-setting organisation, the IFRS Foundation.
Source: Bruegel, see Figure 1.
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KEEPING THE PROMISE OF GLOBAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
1. Somewhat confus-
ingly, these are
numbered IAS 1 to IAS
41 and IFRS 1 to IFRS 9,
as the label was
changed from IAS
(International Account-
ing Standard) to IFRS in
2001. Some past stan-
dards are no longer in
use. To these should be
added so-called IFRS
interpretations (25 cur-
rently in use), which
depending on the con-
text can be referred to
as part of the collective
set known as IFRS. Sep-
arately, a standard
intended primarily for
use by non-listed com-
panies, known as ‘IFRS
for SMEs’, was intro-
duced in 2009.
2. The Monitoring Board
includes the chair of
the US SEC, the Euro-
pean Commissioner for
the Internal Market, the
Commissioner of the
Japanese Financial
Services Agency, and
two representatives of
the International Organ-
isation of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO).
Further expansion of its
membership is under
consideration (Monitor-
ing Board, 2011).
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS are the
norms that govern the prepara-
tion of financial statements by
companies, and as such play a
key role in the proper functioning
of capital markets. All things
being equal, better financial
reporting reduces the cost of
capital by allowing investors to
better assess and compare com-
panies’ financial situations and
operations, especially for listed
companies in which sharehold-
ers are dispersed and have no
access to inside information.
Internationally uniform account-
ing standards can contribute to a
better matching of capital-rich
investors and capital-hungry
issuers on a global scale, and are
therefore an attractive economic
proposition.
This explains the emergence and
rapid spread of International
Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS), the roots of which go
back to a 1973 initiative led by
Henry Benson, a prominent
British accountant. There are cur-
rently 38 IFRS standards,
intended primarily for use by
issuers of public securities1.
Since 2001, IFRS have been
developed and updated by the
International Accounting Stan-
dards Board (IASB), a
16-member committee that
meets about monthly and is sup-
ported by a 110-strong staff
based in London. The IASB is
appointed and financed by the
US-incorporated IFRS Founda-
tion, itself governed by a group of
22 Trustees under a set of rules
dubbed its 'Constitution'. In 2009
the Trustees agreed to submit
their own appointments to
mandatory approval by an ad
hoc group of public authorities
called the Monitoring Board2.
Arguably the most important
milestone in IFRS expansion was
the European Union’s decision in
2000 to require their use by all
listed companies by 2005, a
decision based on near-total con-
sensus3. In its wake, other major
jurisdictions have made IFRS or
variations thereof either manda-
tory for replacing pre-existing
national accounting standards,
or an optional alternative. In
2007, the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)
authorised US-listed foreign
companies to use IFRS. However,
domestic US issuers still have to
use the standards set by the US
Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), known as US
GAAP4. Figure 1 shows how the
IFRS’ 'market share' among the
world’s largest companies has
risen rapidly from marginal to
dominant, and how the EU has
been joined by other jurisdictions
that together will soon represent
the majority of IFRS issuers.
Accounting standards, like any
measurement and disclosure
framework, can influence the
behaviour of economic actors,
even if this is not the standard-
setters' intention. This helps
explain the occasional intensity
of related controversies. Box 1
summarises recent disputes
about the fair-value accounting
principle, which relies on market
prices (or in their absence, valu-
ation models) to determine the
book value of some financial
assets and liabilities. Moreover,
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Source: Bruegel based on FT Global 500 rankings, Datastream. Standards including some variations of pure IFRS, such as in the EU (see page 6), are counted as
IFRS in these figures. Estimates for 2012 are based on the 2009 sample of companies, assuming IFRS use in Brazil, Canada, Japan (companies currently
using US GAAP), Mexico, and South Korea. EMEA: Europe, Middle East and Africa. The right-hand graph sorts companies by location of operational headquarters.
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Figure 1: Adoption of IFRS among the world’s 500 largest listed companies
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3. The key correspon-
ding legislation,
Regulation (EC) No.
1606/2002, was
adopted by 492 votes
in favour out of 526 by
the European Parlia-
ment, and unanimously
by the Council.
4. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles.
5. The IASB has started
discussion on a stan-
dard on Emissions
Trading Schemes in
2009, currently on hold
but expected to restart
later in 2011.
6. See also Véron
(2008) for a more in-
depth analysis of
arguments over fair
value.
7. The IASB’s chairman
was widely reported as
having come close to
resigning on this occa-
sion. See David Jetuah,
‘Tweedie nearly quit
after fair value change’,
Accountancy Age, 12
November 2008.
8. See Francesco Guer-
rera and Jennifer
Hughes, ‘AIG urges ‘fair
value’ rethink’, Finan-
cial Times, 14 March
2008.
not all accounting disputes are
about fair value. In the US, for
example, there were vivid contro-
versies about accounting
standards for mergers and acqui-
sitions in the 1950s, leases and
conglomerates in the 1960s, oil
exploration costs and inflation in
the 1970s, pension obligations
in the 1980s, and stock options
in the 1990s and early 2000s
(Zeff, 2005). Emissions-trading
permits are also likely to give rise
to heated discussions5.
The economic impact of account-
ing standards has major
implications. Standard-setters
are generally accounting profes-
sionals by background and see
their role as intrinsically techni-
cal, namely finding the best
measurement and disclosure
principles for financial state-
ments to give investors the
information they need. But cor-
porate issuers tend to view them
like policymakers, and often
attempt to influence them
accordingly. Auditors also have
special interests in the process,
especially in those cases where
the wording of the standards
may affect their future legal lia-
bility. Governments can have
multiple and sometimes conflict-
ing public-policy objectives
beyond the efficiency of capital
allocation, such as using
accounting standards to influ-
ence corporate behaviour, or
leveraging their control over the
standard-setting process for
their own information needs for
tax, regulatory or statistical pur-
poses. There is also the
possibility of the occasional cap-
ture of governments by private
special interests which can be
facilitated by the arcane content
of some accounting discussions.
These diverging perspectives
imply that the 'quality' of
accounting standards can only
be considered in reference to a
specific group of stakeholders,
rather than in absolute terms.
They also explain why the most
intractable policy debates about
IFRS relate to the governance of
the standard-setting process, ie
to which stakeholders it effec-
tively gives priority.
The second half of 2011 will be
particularly important in shaping
the future of IFRS, with:
• Adjustments to be made to the
IFRS Foundation’s governance,
BOX 1: THE FAIR VALUE CONTROVERSY6
At the start of the financial crisis in 2007-08, many financial exec-
utives called for the suspension of fair-value (also known as
mark-to-market) accounting, claiming that the sudden disappear-
ance of liquidity from markets, such as those for US
mortgage-based securities, had made market price references for
the value of their assets meaningless. At the height of the crisis in
October 2008, EU policymakers strong-armed the IASB into hastily
amending their IAS 39 standard on financial instruments to allow
financial firms to retroactively reclassify assets in order to escape
the requirement to mark them to market prices, at a high cost in
terms of perception of the IASB’s integrity7. Separately, in April
2009, the US FASB loosened its standard on financial-asset impair-
ments, and the IASB later adopted a new financial instruments
standard (IFRS 9) that redefines the scope of fair-value accounting.
Nonetheless, numerous subsequent studies from public authori-
ties and academics (Escaffre et al, 2008; SEC, 2008b; Novoa et al,
2009; Coval et al, 2009; FCAG, 2009; Huizinga and Laeven, 2009;
Laux and Leuz, 2010) concluded against blaming fair-value
accounting for accelerating the crisis, as they generally recom-
mended ‘prudential filters’ in regulatory capital calculations to
mitigate the effect of short-term accounting volatility on capital
requirements. Dissenters (eg Bezold, 2009; Marteau and Morand,
2009) fail to provide any empirical evidence for their harsh
assessment of the fair-value principle. More to the point, the 2007-
08 decline in market price of mortgage-based securities and other
assets, which financial firms had blamed on ‘fire sales’, eventually
appeared to be justified by fundamentals. The possibility of a bias
in financiers’ perceptions is illustrated by the point that the leading
US advocate of suspending fair-value accounting in early 2008 was
Martin Sullivan, then CEO of AIG8. Even so, many leaders still view
fair-value accounting as a negative factor in the crisis, particularly
in Europe (see eg French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech to
the 40th World Economic Forum in Davos, 27 January 2010).
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in the context of a recent grad-
ual loss of trust by key
constituencies, including
global investors, particularly
since the IAS 39 amendment
of October 2008 (see Box 1).
The Trustees have published a
'Strategy Review Report' that
proposes important parame-
ters for future development
(IFRS Foundation, 2011),
and the Monitoring Board has
launched a parallel public con-
sultation (Monitoring Board,
2011); 
• Financial strains and the
Foundation’s increasing
reliance on voluntary funding
from the ‘Big Four’ global
accounting networks9, as
illustrated by Figure 2, which
raise concerns about inde-
pendence and the
medium-term viability of the
current funding model; 
• A commitment by the SEC to
decide in 2011 on the
adoption of IFRS by the US
(SEC, 2008a). Harvey Gold-
schmid, an influential Trustee,
has argued that a negative
outcome or further delay
“would likely have tragic con-
sequences” (Goldschmid,
2010). Even with a less dra-
matic assessment, this is
potentially as important for
IFRS as the EU endorsement
decision was a decade ago; 
• Major changes of leadership at
all levels: the IASB’s chairman
for its first decade, David
Tweedie, was replaced on 1
July by Hans Hoogervorst, a
former Dutch finance minister
and securities regulator; the
Trustees’s chair has been
vacant since the death of
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa in
late 2010; and the Monitoring
Board, initially chaired by Mr
Hoogervorst, must also give
itself a new head. 
ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE CORE: A
CONSISTENT GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK
Global organisations tend to fall
into one of two main categories.
Those in the public sector, such
as the United Nations (UN) or the
International Monetary Fund,
generally have a state-based
governance model which holds
them accountable to individual
governments. Those in the pri-
vate sector generally have a
stateless governance model that
involves either accountability to
a community of stakeholders not
defined by nationality (such as
corporations vis-à-vis their
shareholders, or global partner-
ships vis-à-vis their partners), or
no formal accountability mecha-
nism other than reputation (as in
the case of many charities, NGOs
and foundations, which are
essentially self-governed).
The IFRS Foundation started as a
self-governed organisation under
a stateless governance model,
embedded in its Constitution as
initially adopted in 2001. How-
ever, the Foundation
subsequently made two major
steps towards a state-based
model. First, in 2006 it adopted a
new funding strategy based on
‘non-voluntary contributions’ cal-
culated for each country (and
the EU) in proportion to GDP. This
now partly implemented scheme
makes the Foundation depend-
ent on the support of each
relevant government, which has
a monopoly on legal coercion to
pay. It is thus functionally equiv-
alent to voluntary funding by
governments, which gives them
significant potential leverage.
Second, the 2009 creation of the
Monitoring Board, to which the
Trustees granted the control of
their own selection and reap-
pointments, established this
state-based group, composed of
representatives of individual
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Figure 2: The IFRS Foundation’s deficits and dependence
on ‘Big Four’ audit networks (% of annual revenues)
Source: Bruegel based on IFRS Foundation’s Annual Reports (2002-09) and presentation on Finan-
cial Position (April 2011, available on www.ifrs.org).
9. Deloitte, Ernst &
Young, KPMG, and Price-
waterhouseCoopers.
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10. The name of the
Monitoring Board is a
misnomer, as its
powers already go well
beyond monitoring and
can be expected to fur-
ther expand in the
future (Monitoring
Board, 2011) – even
though the Memoran-
dum of Understanding
between the Trustees
and members of the
Monitoring Board, that
establishes this trans-
fer of power, can
theoretically be
revoked.
11. For example, in
Canada, Japan and the
US, public authorities
have less direct control
over national account-
ing standard-setters
than the Monitoring
Board has over IFRS
Foundation Trustee
appointments.
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jurisdictions, and would find it
practically impossible to deliver
standards that serve investors’
information needs properly. The
corresponding deterioration of
the quality of IFRS may eventu-
ally result in the emergence of
competing standards preferred
by investors, possibly causing a
new episode of fragmentation.
Conversely, the significant eco-
nomic impact of accounting
standards implies that a purely
stateless governance model
would be unrealistic. Therefore,
the IFRS Foundation has to
invent an innovative hybrid of
governments (and the European
Commission), as the de facto
highest governing body of the
IFRS Foundation, a major change
the consequences of which are
gradually unfolding10.
Unfortunately, this increasingly
state-based model jars with the
IFRS Foundation’s mandate. The
purpose of public financial infor-
mation is to correct information
asymmetries to the benefit of
dispersed investors, an aim that
has been confirmed by both the
Monitoring Board (2009) and the
Trustees’ Strategy Review Report.
This calls for a stateless gover-
nance model that would make
the IFRS Foundation accountable
to the global investor commu-
nity, as investors do not act on
the basis of territoriality, and
their interests cannot be prop-
erly represented by individual
governments – which typically
tend to favour the more powerful
countervailing interests of corpo-
rate issuers – or national
securities regulators, which are
ultimately accountable to their
respective governments. Indeed,
in most advanced economies,
governments have come to the
conclusion that high-quality
accounting standards requires
an independent standard-setter
with dominant input from the pri-
vate sector11. A purely
state-based model is bound to
gradually transform the IFRS
Foundation into an ‘accounting
UN’ which would permanently
seek compromises between dif-
ferent understandings of the
public interest (including the
multifaceted concept of ‘finan-
cial stability’) in different
BOX 2: A TENTATIVE PROPOSAL FOR INVESTOR REPRESENTATION AT
THE TOP OF THE IFRS FOUNDATION
The IFRS Foundation would put in place a global Investor Consulta-
tion Network, using internet-based tools to be able to directly
consult individuals who are professionally involved in investment
activities, with an appropriate process of voluntary registration
and checking. This would serve as a sounding board to validate
appointments of investor representatives, which would only
become effective after a sufficient number of Network members
(representing a suitable quorum) have endorsed them. The
Trustees would appoint an Investor Representative Selection Com-
mittee of, say, 15 individuals who command trust from the global
investor community. Following this initial appointment the Com-
mittee would renew itself by cooptation, with all initial and
subsequent appointments subject to validation by the Investor
Consultation Network. The Investor Selection Committee would
nominate Investor Representatives to the Monitoring Board (also
subject to validation by the Network), whose number would gradu-
ally increase and eventually represent the majority of the Board. 
Investing entities (such as asset management companies, invest-
ment funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices, etc) would be
encouraged to contribute to the IFRS Foundation’s financing on a
voluntary basis. This voluntary funding scheme would be more
sustainable than the one adopted by the IFRS Foundation in the
past, as investors’ interests are more directly aligned than those of
issuers with the IFRS Foundation’s mandate. Naturally, such a vol-
untary funding mechanism, which would take significant time and
resources to establish, could only gradually replace the Founda-
tion’s current funding model. 
The Constitution would be amended to make the Monitoring Board
an integral body of the IFRS Foundation, rather than an external
group as it is now, and introduce qualified-majority voting rules for
Monitoring Board decisions. The Constitution would also make it a
condition that Trustees could only be appointed if their past expe-
rience gives credence to their commitment to high-quality
standards that serve the needs of capital providers.
state-based and stateless
models, reflecting its unique
global policymaking position in
the absence of a global govern-
ment that could play
the same role as gov-
ernments do in
national environ-
ments. The scattered
nature of the investor
community, which
has hindered the
emergence of organisations that
would represent it at global
level12, represents an additional
difficulty, which the Foundation
can overcome only by taking a
proactive role of ‘community
organising’. Not enough thought
has been given so far to possible
corresponding options. Box 2
describes one imperfect, tenta-
tive scheme, to which more
debate could certainly bring
improvements.
Other steps should also be con-
sidered to improve the
IFRS Foundation’s governance,
particularly in terms of geo-
graphical balance13. The
Monitoring Board’s public-sector
membership should be expanded
to major emerging economies,
and the EU should be repre-
sented by the European
Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA) rather than the European
Commission, as securities regu-
lators are generally best placed
among public authorities to
understand and support the
IFRS Foundation’s mission to
serve the information needs of
investors14. The Trustee level
should be reinforced by making
the Chair of Trustees a full-time
position, and by more clearly
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12. The CFA Institute
and the International
Corporate Governance
Network have a claim to
represent global
investors, but arguably
not sufficient to be for-
mally embedded in the
IFRS Foundation’s gov-
ernance framework
(note: the author sits on
committees in both of
these organisations).
13. For more detail,
including a proposal for
jurisdictions’ respective
voting power within the
Monitoring Board, see
the author’s responses
to recent public consul-
tations (Véron, 2011a
and 2011b).
14. Simultaneously,
financial regulatory
bodies such as the
Basel Committee
should further develop
prudential ‘filters’ to
mitigate the geographi-
cal distortions and
procyclical impacts that
may be induced by
their capital and lever-
age standards if these
are too directly based
on IFRS accounting.
15. In early October
2010, the last time all
three positions were
permanently filled, they
were all held by Euro-
peans (respectively
Hans Hoogervorst,
Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa, and David
Tweedie).
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separating their secretariat from
the IASB’s staff. This secretariat
could be located in the Americas,
and the Monitoring Board’s sec-
retariat in Asia, or
vice versa. Geograph-
ical balance should
also be sought
among the chairs of
the Monitoring Board,
the Trustees and the
IASB15. 
ADAPTABILITY ON THE GROUND:
ACCOMMODATING THE WORLD’S
DIVERSITY
Full global accounting harmoni-
sation is the promise of IFRS and
should remain the long-term
goal. But it will not be achieved
any time soon. China, India and
Russia have made significant
steps towards IFRS but appear in
no mood to renounce the option
of keeping some of their stan-
dards different. At the time of
writing, the US
seems likely to
adopt an approach
colloquially known
as ‘condorsement’
(blend of conver-
gence and
endorsement), under which
some US standards would only
gradually converge towards their
IFRS equivalents, while others
would be replaced by IFRS out-
right (SEC, 2011). Japan is
widely expected to cautiously
follow the steps taken by the US.
Even the EU, in spite of its past
pioneering approach to IFRS, has
often appeared to disagree with
the IASB in recent years and may
not endorse all its standards in
the future16. At least for some
time, there will be several ‘IFRS
dialects’, some close to ‘pure
IFRS’ (all standards as adopted
by the IASB), some only remotely
comparable.
As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, IFRS standard-setting
should be focused on the infor-
mation needs of investors, and
the IFRS Foundation cannot
itself integrate multiple and
occasionally divergent views of
the public interest around the
world. This makes it legitimate
that individual jurisdictions
should be able to opt to not
endorse all IFRS standards, if
they believe they have valid
public-interest reasons not to. In
the EU, Regulation (EC)
1606/2002 states that only
standards that ‘are conducive to
the European public good’ should
be endorsed. Most other jurisdic-
tions have similar safeguard
clauses or can be expected to
introduce them.
However, this dis-
cretion should not
be abused. Compa-
rability of financial
statements across
borders is a global
public good that depends on
maximum harmonisation of
accounting standards17.
To avoid a harmful proliferation of
IFRS dialects, there should be
proper incentives for conver-
gence. First, jurisdictions that
choose not to endorse a standard
should explain why. Second, if
they endorse a standard with
modifications, they should not
keep its IFRS name – for exam-
ple, the ‘carved-out’ version of
‘The IFRS Founda-
tion must invent a
hybrid of state-
based and
stateless models.’
‘The IFRS Founda-
tion needs to
organise the investor
community.’
IAS 39 in the EU should be given
a different, EU-specific, name to
avoid confusion. Third, transla-
tion into local languages should
be subject to stricter control and
validation by the IFRS Founda-
tion18. Fourth, issuers should be
clear about which set of stan-
dards they are using, whether
‘pure IFRS’ or the locally
endorsed ‘dialect’,
and auditors and reg-
ulators should not
tolerate fuzziness –
IOSCO has made
efforts in that direc-
tion but more needs
to be done. Fifth, all jurisdictions
should allow the use of ‘pure
IFRS’ as an alternative to the
local ‘dialect’, and make it com-
pulsory for cross-border listings,
possibly with limited ‘reconcilia-
tion requirements’ as the US has
long required from foreign
issuers. The IFRS Foundation
cannot impose such practices
but could encourage their
adoption and monitor compli-
ance, naming and shaming
free-riders and thus discouraging
companies and countries from
claiming adoption of IFRS when
they only ‘speak dialect’. More
generally the Foundation should
produce more detailed jurisdic-
tion-level data on the status of
IFRS endorsement and use by
various categories of companies,
as part of an expanded research
capacity (including on the eco-
nomic effect of IFRS), which the
Trustees’ Strategy Review Report
rightly calls for.
In the case of the US, the fifth
proposal would mean the coexis-
tence of two sets of standards,
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16.There is already one
case of such divergence,
as the EU ‘carved out’
(deleted) part of the IAS
39 standard on financial
instruments when
endorsing it in 2004. 
17. As numerous studies
have established, har-
monisation of
accounting standards is
not a sufficient condition
for cross-border financial
reporting comparability,
which also depends on
cultural and institutional
factors including audit
quality and public
enforcement. But it is a
necessary condition
nevertheless.
18. For example, the
French translation of
IFRS used in Canada has
been validated by the
IASB, but the translation
that has binding status
in France is a different
version produced by the
EU’s translators.
19. A similar proposal is
made in Leuz (2011).
20. See Kevin Reed,
‘Allow small listed firms
to duck IFRS’, Account-
ancy Age, 18 May 2011.
21. See Rose Orlik, ‘IFRS
critics see momentum
gathering’, Accountancy
Age, 9 June 2011.
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with some US companies using
pure IFRS, and others using the
modified US GAAP under the
‘condorsement’ approach, in
other words the US IFRS dialect.
Past and present examples
including Germany, Japan and
Switzerland suggest this would
be manageable19. Also, the SEC
should endorse most IFRS stan-
dards early on, and
adopt the ‘conver-
gence’ approach only
for the handful of
really contentious
cases. This would
create trust and a
sense of commitment, and would
also encourage constructive
approaches in other jurisdictions.
Flexibility will also be needed to
determine which companies
should report under IFRS, beyond
the large listed
issuers whose use of
IFRS generates most
of the benefits in
terms of cross-
border comparability.
At least for some
time, local accounting standards
could remain in use for non-listed
and even possibly smaller listed
companies20, and for single-
entity (as opposed as
consolidated) accounts which
are embedded in local corporate
and tax law and whose shift to
IFRS can generate mismatches21.
Finally, comparability depends
crucially on how the standards
are implemented and enforced.
The Trustees’ Strategy Review
Report’s proposal that “the IASB
will work with a network of secu-
rities regulators, audit
regulators, standard-setters and
other stakeholders to identify
divergence in practice” is a wel-
come initiative in this respect.
This may not preclude enforce-
ment authorities, such as the
SEC, from issuing local guidance
on IFRS application, as long as
such guidance does not contra-
dict IFRS. This amounts to local
‘accents’ that do not threaten the
integrity of the IFRS ‘language’,
even though the IASB may gradu-
ally amend its standards to
reduce corresponding regional
differences. In the EU, any guid-
ance should be issued by ESMA,
which should also strongly coor-
dinate IFRS enforcement at EU
level. Such regional and global
efforts are necessary comple-
ments to standards harmonisation
in order to maximise the economic
value of IFRS adoption.
The vision of full
global harmonisation
of financial reporting
appears increasingly
ambitious as the
world gradually dis-
covers the
ramifications of IFRS adoption.
Its ultimate success is not guar-
anteed. But the prize, a globally
unified accounting language that
can contribute to reducing the
cost of capital across the world,
remains well worth the effort.
With the right combination of
clarity of purpose, institutional
creativity, and flexibility on the
ground, the IFRS promise can be
brought ever closer to fulfillment.
Mauricio Nakahodo’s and
Christophe Gouardo’s excellent
research assistance is gratefully
acknowledged.
‘For some time,
there will be “IFRS
dialects” alongside
“pure IFRS”.’
‘“Pure IFRS”
should be allowed
as an option
everywhere.’
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